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1 view
1. noun1) (range of vision) Sicht, dieget a good view of something — etwas gut sehen können
have a clear/distant view of something — etwas deutlich/in der Ferne sehen können
be out of/in view — nicht zu sehen/zu sehen sein
come into view — in Sicht kommen
our hotel has a good view of the sea — von unserem Hotel aus kann man das Meer gut sehen
2) (what is seen) Aussicht, diethe views from here — die Aussicht von hier
a room with a view — ein Zimmer mit Aussicht
3) (picture) Ansicht, diephotographic view — Foto, das
4) (opinion) Ansicht, diewhat is your view or are your views on this? — was meinst du dazu?
don't you have any view[s] about it? — hast du keine Meinung dazu?
the general/majority view is that... — die Allgemeinheit/Mehrheit ist der Ansicht, dass...
have or hold views about or on something — eine Meinung über etwas (Akk.) haben
hold or take the view that... — der Ansicht sein, dass...
I take a different view — ich bin anderer Ansicht
take a critical/grave/optimistic view of something — etwas kritisch/ernst/optimistisch beurteilen
5)be on view — [Waren, Haus:] besichtigt werden können; [Bauplan:] [zur Einsicht] ausliegen
in view of something — (fig.) angesichts einer Sache
with a view to or with a or the view of doing something — in der Absicht, etwas zu tun
with a view to something — (fig.) mit etwas im Auge
2. transitive verbwith this in view — in Anbetracht dessen; see also academic.ru/56438/point">point I 1.
1) (look at) sich (Dat.) ansehen2) (consider) betrachten; beurteilen [Situation, Problem]viewed in this light... — so gesehen...
3) (inspect) besichtigen3. intransitive verb(Telev.) fernsehen* * *[vju:] 1. noun1) ((an outlook on to, or picture of) a scene: Your house has a fine view of the hills; He painted a view of the harbour.) die (An)Sicht2) (an opinion: Tell me your view/views on the subject.) die Ansicht3) (an act of seeing or inspecting: We were given a private view of the exhibition before it was opened to the public.) die Besichtigung2. verb(to look at, or regard (something): She viewed the scene with astonishment.) betrachten- viewer- viewpoint
- in view of
- on view
- point of view* * *[vju:]I. nin full \view of all the spectators vor den Augen aller Zuschauerto come into \view in Sicht kommen, sichtbar werdento disappear from [or out of] \view [in der Ferne] verschwindenthe house is hidden from \view behind a high hedge das Haus liegt den Blicken entzogen hinter einer hohen Hecketo keep sb/sth in \view jdn/etw im Auge behaltenwe have a clear \view of the sea wir haben freien Blick aufs Meerthe \view from our living room over the valley is breathtaking der [Aus]blick von unserem Wohnzimmer über das Tal ist atemberaubendhe paints rural \views er malt ländliche Motivehe lifted his daughter up so that she could get a better \view er hob seine Tochter hoch, sodass sie besser sehen konnteto have a bird's-eye \view of sth etw aus der Vogelperspektive sehenpanoramic \view Panoramablick mto afford a \view einen Blick [o eine Aussicht] bietento be on \view works of art ausgestellt werdento be on \view to the public der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich seinin sb's \view nach jds Einschätzungwhat are your \views on this issue? was meinen Sie zu dieser Frage?it's my \view that the price is much too high meiner Meinung nach ist der Preis viel zu hochexchange of \views Meinungsaustausch m\view of the market Markteinschätzung fpoint of \view Gesichtspunkt m, Standpunkt mfrom my point of \view... meiner Meinung nach...world \view Weltanschauung fconflicting \views widersprüchliche Meinungenjaundiced/prevailing \view zynische/vorherrschende Meinungthere is a prevailing \view that... es herrscht die Ansicht, dass...to air one's \views seine Ansichten darlegento express a \view eine Meinung ausdrücken [o zum Ausdruck bringen]to have an optimistic \view of life eine optimistische Lebenseinstellung habento take a dim [or poor] \view of sth nicht viel von etw dat haltento hold strong \views about sth über etw akk strenge Ansichten habento make a \view known eine Ansicht mitteilento share a \view gleicher Meinung sein, eine Ansicht teilenthis \view is not widely shared diese Ansicht wird nicht von vielen geteilt▪ in sb's \view jds Ansicht nachfrom the money point of \view, the plan is very attractive but from the work point of \view, it's a disaster vom Finanziellen her gesehen ist der Plan sehr verlockend, aber von der Arbeit her ist er eine Katastrophewe take a very serious \view of the situation wir nehmen die Situation sehr ernstto take a long-/short-term \view eine langfristige/vorläufige Perspektive einnehmento take an overall \view of sth etw von allen Seiten betrachten▪ with a \view to doing sth mit der Absicht, etw zu tunhave you anything in \view for when you leave college? hast du [schon] irgendeine Idee, was du machen willst, wenn du vom College abgehst?II. vt1. (watch)▪ to \view sth [from sth] etw [von etw dat aus] betrachten; (as a spectator) etw dat [von etw dat aus] zusehen [ o bes SÜDD, ÖSTERR, SCHWEIZ zuschauen▪ to \view sb/sth [as sb/sth] jdn/etw [als jdn/etw] betrachtenwe \view the situation with concern wir betrachten die Lage mit Besorgnisto \view sth from a different angle etw aus einem anderen Blickwinkel betrachten3. (inspect)to \view a flat/a house eine Wohnung/ein Haus besichtigen* * *[vjuː]1. n1) (= range of vision) Sicht fthe magician placed the box in full view of the audience — der Zauberer stellte die Kiste so auf, dass das ganze Publikum sie sehen konnte
the ship came into view —
the cameraman had a job keeping the plane in view — der Kameramann fand es schwierig, das Flugzeug zu verfolgen
to go out of view — außer Sicht kommen, verschwinden
the house is within view of the sea —
the house is exposed to view from passing trains — das Haus kann von vorbeifahrenden Zügen aus eingesehen werden
hidden from view — verborgen, versteckt
the house is hidden from view from the main road — das Haus ist von der Hauptstraße aus nicht zu sehen
on view (for purchasing) — zur Ansicht; (of exhibits) ausgestellt
there is a splendid view from here/from the top — von hier/von der Spitze hat man einen herrlichen Blick or eine wunderschöne Aussicht
a view over... — ein Blick m über... (acc)
I only got a side view of his head — ich habe seinen Kopf nur im Profil gesehen
he stood up to get a better view — er stand auf, um besser sehen zu können
3) (= photograph etc) Ansicht f (ALSO COMPUT)views of London — Ansichten pl or Stadtbilder pl von London
4) (= opinion) Ansicht f, Meinung fto take the view that... — die Ansicht vertreten, dass...
See:→ point5)(= mental survey)
an idealistic view of the world — eine idealistische Welt(an)sichta general or overall view of a problem —
in view of — wegen (+gen), angesichts (+gen)
at first view —
we must not lose from view the fact that... I'll keep it in view — wir dürfen die Tatsache nicht aus dem Auge verlieren, dass... ich werde es im Auge behalten
with a view to doing sth — mit der Absicht, etw zu tun
he has the weekend in view when he says... — er denkt an das Wochenende, wenn er sagt...
2. vt1) (= see) betrachten3) (= consider) problem etc sehen4) (COMPUT: command) anzeigen3. vi(= watch television) fernsehen* * *view [vjuː]A v/t1. obs sehen, erblicken2. (sich) etwas ansehen, besichtigen, in Augenschein nehmen:view a flat eine Wohnung besichtigenas als)B v/i fernsehenC s1. Besichtigung f, Inaugenscheinnahme f:at first view auf den ersten Blick;on nearer view bei näherer Betrachtung;be plain to (the) view gut sichtbar sein3. Sicht f (auch fig):a) in Sicht, sichtbar,b) fig in (Aus)Sicht;in full view of direkt vor jemandes Augen;get a full view of etwas ganz zu sehen bekommen;on view zu besichtigen(d), ausgestellt;on the long view fig auf weite Sicht;out of view außer Sicht, nicht mehr zu sehen;come in view in Sicht kommen, sichtbar werden;keep sth in view fig etwas im Auge behalten;lose view of aus den Augen verlieren;there is no view of success es besteht keine Aussicht auf Erfolg4. a) (Aus)Sicht f, (Aus-)Blick m (of, over auf akk):there is a grand view of the mountains from here von hier hat man einen herrlichen Blick auf die Bergeb) Szenerie f, Blick m5. MAL, FOTO Ansicht f, Bild n:6. (kritischer) Überblick (of über akk)7. Absicht f:b) im Hinblick auf (akk)8. (of, on) Ansicht f, Meinung f, Urteil n (von, über akk), Auffassung f (von):view of life Lebensanschauung f;in my view in meinen Augen, meines Erachtens;what is your view on …? was halten Sie von …?, wie beurteilen Sie …?;it is my view that … ich bin der Ansicht, dass …;be of the same view der gleichen Ansicht sein;form a view on sich ein Urteil bilden über (akk);hold extreme views extreme Ansichten vertreten;take a bright (dim, grave, strong) view of etwas optimistisch (pessimistisch, ernst, hart) beurteilen9. Vorführung f:* * *1. noun1) (range of vision) Sicht, diehave a clear/distant view of something — etwas deutlich/in der Ferne sehen können
be out of/in view — nicht zu sehen/zu sehen sein
2) (what is seen) Aussicht, die3) (picture) Ansicht, diephotographic view — Foto, das
4) (opinion) Ansicht, diewhat is your view or are your views on this? — was meinst du dazu?
don't you have any view[s] about it? — hast du keine Meinung dazu?
the general/majority view is that... — die Allgemeinheit/Mehrheit ist der Ansicht, dass...
have or hold views about or on something — eine Meinung über etwas (Akk.) haben
hold or take the view that... — der Ansicht sein, dass...
take a critical/grave/optimistic view of something — etwas kritisch/ernst/optimistisch beurteilen
5)be on view — [Waren, Haus:] besichtigt werden können; [Bauplan:] [zur Einsicht] ausliegen
in view of something — (fig.) angesichts einer Sache
with a view to or with a or the view of doing something — in der Absicht, etwas zu tun
with a view to something — (fig.) mit etwas im Auge
2. transitive verbwith this in view — in Anbetracht dessen; see also point I 1.
1) (look at) sich (Dat.) ansehen2) (consider) betrachten; beurteilen [Situation, Problem]viewed in this light... — so gesehen...
3) (inspect) besichtigen3. intransitive verbask to view something — darum bitten, etwas besichtigen zu dürfen
(Telev.) fernsehen* * *v.betrachten v.prüfen v.sehen v.(§ p.,pp.: sah, gesehen) (in regard to) n.Hinblick -e m. (of) n.Betrachtungsweise f. n.Anblick -e m.Anschauung f.Ansicht -en f.Auffassung f.Aussicht -en f.Betrachtung f.Blick -e m. -
2 perspective
noun1) Perspektive, die; (fig.) Blickwinkel, derput a different perspective on events — ein neues Licht auf die Ereignisse werfen
[do] keep things in perspective — das darfst du nicht so eng sehen; (don't get too excited) bleib mal auf dem Teppich
* * *[pə'spektiv]1) (the way of drawing solid objects, natural scenes etc on a flat surface, so that they appear to have the correct shape, distance from each other etc: Early medieval paintings lacked perspective.) die Perspektive2) (a picture or view of something: I would like a clearer perspective of the situation.) die Perspektive•- academic.ru/116753/in___out_of_perspective">in / out of perspective* * *per·spec·tive[pəˈspektɪv, AM pɚˈ-]nfrom a historical \perspective aus geschichtlicher Sichtto see sth in a new \perspective etw aus einem neuen Blickwinkel sehento put sth in [or into] \perspective etw in die richtige Perspektive rückenin \perspective perspektivischout of \perspective perspektivisch verzerrt* * *[pə'spektɪv]n (lit)Perspektive f; (fig also) Blickwinkel mto get a different perspective on a problem — ein Problem aus einer anderen Perspektive or aus einem anderen Blickwinkel sehen
try to keep/get things in perspective — versuchen Sie, nüchtern und sachlich zu bleiben/das nüchtern und sachlich zu sehen
to get sth out of perspective ( lit : artist etc ) — etw perspektivisch verzerren; (fig) etw verzerrt sehen
to see things in their proper or true perspective — die Dinge so sehen, wie sie sind
* * *perspective [pə(r)ˈspektıv]A s1. MATH, MAL etc Perspektive f:in (true) perspective in richtiger Perspektive, perspektivisch (richtig) ( → A 3);the houses are out of perspective bei den Häusern stimmt die Perspektive nicht2. perspektivische Zeichnung3. Perspektive f:a) Aussicht f, Ausblick m (beide auch fig), Durchblick mb) fig Blick m für die Dinge im richtigen Verhältnis:he has no perspective er sieht die Dinge nicht im richtigen Verhältnis (zueinander);keep sth in perspective etwas relativ sehen;put sth into perspective etwas in die richtige Perspektive rückenB adj perspektivisch (Zeichnung etc):* * *noun1) Perspektive, die; (fig.) Blickwinkel, der[do] keep things in perspective — das darfst du nicht so eng sehen; (don't get too excited) bleib mal auf dem Teppich
* * *n.Blickwinkel m.Perspektive f. -
3 VISTA
noun2) (fig.)* * *vis·ta[ˈvɪstə]nto open up new \vistas neue Perspektiven eröffnen* * *(US) abbr US-Hilfsorganisation, die Freiwillige zur Hilfe Einkommensschwacher abstellt* * ** * *noun2) (fig.)* * *n.Blick -e m. -
4 vista
noun2) (fig.)* * *vis·ta[ˈvɪstə]nto open up new \vistas neue Perspektiven eröffnen* * *(US) abbr US-Hilfsorganisation, die Freiwillige zur Hilfe Einkommensschwacher abstellt* * *vista [ˈvıstə] s1. (Aus-, Durch)Blick m, Aussicht f:2. Allee f3. ARCH (langer) Gang, Korridor m, Galerie f:vista of arches Bogengang4. fig Reihe f:of auf akk), Möglichkeit f, Perspektive f:his words opened (up) new vistas seine Worte eröffneten neue Perspektiven;dim vistas of the future trübe Zukunftsaussichten* * *noun2) (fig.)* * *n.Blick -e m. -
5 vista
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6 block
blok
1. noun1) (a flat-sided mass of wood or stone etc: blocks of stone.) bloque2) (a piece of wood used for certain purposes: a chopping-block.) zoquete, tarugo3) (a connected group of houses, offices etc: a block of flats; an office block.) bloque4) (a barrier: a road block.) barrera, control policial5) ((especially American) a group of buildings bounded by four streets: a walk round the block.) manzana
2. verb(to make (progress) difficult or impossible: The crashed cars blocked the road.) bloquear, obstruir- blockade
3. verbThe ships blockaded the town.) bloquear- blockage- blocked
- block capital/letter
- blockhead
block1 n1. bloque / taco2. bloque / edificio3. manzanablock2 vb obstruir / atascar / bloqueartr[blɒk]1 bloque nombre masculino2 (of wood, stone) taco3 (building) edificio, bloque nombre masculino4 (group of buildings) manzana5 (obstruction) obstrucción nombre femenino1 (pipe etc) obstruir, atascar2 (streets etc) bloquear\SMALLIDIOMATIC EXPRESSION/SMALLto block the way cerrar el pasoto become blocked obstruirse, atascarseto knock somebody's block off romperle la crisma a alguiento take a walk around the block dar una vueltablock and tackle aparejo de poleasblock letters mayúsculas nombre femenino pluralblock of flats bloque nombre masculino de pisosblock of seats grupo de asientosblock booking reserva en grupoblock vote voto por cabeza de delegaciónbuilding blocks juego de construcciónmental block bloqueo mentalnote block taco, bloc nombre masculino de notasblock ['blɑk] vt1) obstruct: obstruir, bloquear2) clog: atascar, atorarblock n1) piece: bloque mbuilding blocks: cubos de construcciónauction block: plataforma de subastasstarting block: taco de salida2) obstruction: obstrucción f, bloqueo m3) : cuadra f, manzana f (de edificios)to go around the block: dar la vuelta a la cuadra4) building: edificio m (de apartamentos, oficinas, etc.)5) group, series: serie f, grupo ma block of tickets: una serie de entradas6)block and tackle : aparejo m de poleasn.• molde (Letra) s.m.n.• bloque s.m.• bloqueo s.m.• calzo s.m.• crujía s.f.• cuadra s.f.• horma s.f.• manzana (De casas) s.f.• motón s.m.• obstáculo s.m.• piedra s.f.• plataforma s.f.• tajo s.m.• zoquete s.m.v.• bloquear v.• bloquearse v.• enclavar v.• obstruir v.blɑːk, blɒk
I
1)a) (of stone, wood) bloque mto knock somebody's block off — (colloq) romperle* la crisma a alguien (fam)
b) ( starting block) ( Sport) taco m de salidato be first off the blocks — ser* el primero en la salida
c) ( of paper) bloc m2)a) ( space enclosed by streets) manzana f; ( distance between two streets)to go for a walk around the block — dar* una vuelta a la manzana
it's eight blocks from here — (AmE) está a ocho cuadras (AmL) or (Esp) calles de aquí
b) ( building)a block of flats — (BrE) un edificio de apartamentos or de departamentos (AmL), una casa de pisos (Esp)
3) ( section of text) sección f, bloque m4) ( Comput) bloque m5)a) ( blockage) obstrucción f, bloqueo mb) ( obstacle)block to something — obstáculo m para algo
c) ( embargo) bloqueo m6) ( Sport) bloqueo m
II
1.
1)a) ( obstruct) \<\<road/entrance\>\> bloquearyou're blocking my way — me estás impidiendo or bloqueando el paso
b) \<\<drain/sink\>\> atascar*, tapar (AmL)2)a) ( prevent) \<\<progress\>\> obstaculizar*, impedir*; \<\<funds/sale\>\> congelar, bloquearb) ( Sport) bloquear
2.
vi ( Sport) bloquearPhrasal Verbs:- block in- block up[blɒk]1. N1) [of stone] bloque m; [of wood] zoquete m, tarugo m; (for paving) adoquín m; (butcher's, executioner's) tajo m; (=toy) (also: building block) cubo m; [of brake] zapata f; [of cylinder] bloque mchip2) (=building) bloque m; (esp US) (=group of buildings) manzana f, cuadra f (LAm)block of flats — (Brit) bloque m de pisos (Sp), edificio m de departamentos (LAm)
three blocks from here — (esp US) a tres manzanas de aquí
3) (=section) [of tickets, stamps] serie fblock of seats — grupo m de asientos
block of shares — paquete m de acciones
writer's block — bloqueo m de escritor
5) (Brit) (Typ) molde m; (=writing pad) bloc m6) (Sport)blocks (also: starting blocks) tacos mpl de salidato be first/last off the blocks — ser el más rápido/lento en la salida; (fig) ser el más/menos madrugador
7) (Comput) bloque m8) * (=head)- knock sb's block off2. VT1) (=obstruct) [+ road, gangway] bloquear; [+ traffic, progress] estorbar, impedir; [+ pipe] obstruir; (Parl) [+ bill] bloquear; (Comm) [+ account] bloquear; (Sport) bloquear, pararhe stopped in the doorway, blocking her view — se paró en la entrada, tapándole la vista
am I blocking your view? — ¿te estoy tapando?
2) (Comput) agrupar3.VI (Sport) bloquear, parar4.CPDblock and tackle N — (Tech) aparejo m de poleas
block booking N — reserva f en bloque
block capitals NPL — (letras fpl) mayúsculas fpl
in block capitals — en mayúsculas, en letra or caracteres de imprenta
block diagram N — diagrama m de bloques
block grant N — subvención f en bloque
block letters NPL — = block capitals
block release N — (Brit) (Scol) exención f por estudios
block vote N — voto m por representación
- block in- block up* * *[blɑːk, blɒk]
I
1)a) (of stone, wood) bloque mto knock somebody's block off — (colloq) romperle* la crisma a alguien (fam)
b) ( starting block) ( Sport) taco m de salidato be first off the blocks — ser* el primero en la salida
c) ( of paper) bloc m2)a) ( space enclosed by streets) manzana f; ( distance between two streets)to go for a walk around the block — dar* una vuelta a la manzana
it's eight blocks from here — (AmE) está a ocho cuadras (AmL) or (Esp) calles de aquí
b) ( building)a block of flats — (BrE) un edificio de apartamentos or de departamentos (AmL), una casa de pisos (Esp)
3) ( section of text) sección f, bloque m4) ( Comput) bloque m5)a) ( blockage) obstrucción f, bloqueo mb) ( obstacle)block to something — obstáculo m para algo
c) ( embargo) bloqueo m6) ( Sport) bloqueo m
II
1.
1)a) ( obstruct) \<\<road/entrance\>\> bloquearyou're blocking my way — me estás impidiendo or bloqueando el paso
b) \<\<drain/sink\>\> atascar*, tapar (AmL)2)a) ( prevent) \<\<progress\>\> obstaculizar*, impedir*; \<\<funds/sale\>\> congelar, bloquearb) ( Sport) bloquear
2.
vi ( Sport) bloquearPhrasal Verbs:- block in- block up -
7 Artificial Intelligence
In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, EventuallyJust as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)5) Problems in Machine Intelligence Arise Because Things Obvious to Any Person Are Not Represented in the ProgramMany problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)[AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract FormThe basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory FormationIt is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular ContextsEven if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial IntelligenceThe primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary PropositionsIn artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence
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8 Mind-body Problem
From this I knew that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is to think, and that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material thing; so that this "me," that is to say, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from body, and is even more easy to know than is the latter; and even if body were not, the soul would not cease to be what it is. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 101)still remains to be explained how that union and apparent intermingling [of mind and body]... can be found in you, if you are incorporeal, unextended and indivisible.... How, at least, can you be united with the brain, or some minute part in it, which (as has been said) must yet have some magnitude or extension, however small it be? If you are wholly without parts how can you mix or appear to mix with its minute subdivisions? For there is no mixture unless each of the things to be mixed has parts that can mix with one another. (Gassendi, 1970, p. 201)here are... certain things which we experience in ourselves and which should be attributed neither to the mind nor body alone, but to the close and intimate union that exists between the body and the mind.... Such are the appetites of hunger, thirst, etc., and also the emotions or passions of the mind which do not subsist in mind or thought alone... and finally all the sensations. (Descartes, 1970b, p. 238)With any other sort of mind, absolute Intelligence, Mind unattached to a particular body, or Mind not subject to the course of time, the psychologist as such has nothing to do. (James, 1890, p. 183)[The] intention is to furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science: that is to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifiable material particles, thus making these processes perspicuous and free from contradiction. (Freud, 1966, p. 295)The thesis is that the mental is nomologically irreducible: there may be true general statements relating the mental and the physical, statements that have the logical form of a law; but they are not lawlike (in a strong sense to be described). If by absurdly remote chance we were to stumble on a non-stochastic true psychophysical generalization, we would have no reason to believe it more than roughly true. (Davidson, 1970, p. 90)We can divide those who uphold the doctrine that men are machines, or a similar doctrine, into two categories: those who deny the existence of mental events, or personal experiences, or of consciousness;... and those who admit the existence of mental events, but assert that they are "epiphenomena"-that everything can be explained without them, since the material world is causally closed. (Popper & Eccles, 1977, p. 5)Mind affects brain and brain affects mind. That is the message, and by accepting it you commit yourself to a special view of the world. It is a view that shows the limits of the genetic imperative on what we turn out to be, both intellectually and emotionally. It decrees that, while the secrets of our genes express themselves with force throughout our lives, the effect of that information on our bodies can be influenced by our psychological history and beliefs about the world. And, just as important, the other side of the same coin argues that what we construct in our minds as objective reality may simply be our interpretations of certain bodily states dictated by our genes and expressed through our physical brains and body. Put differently, various attributes of mind that seem to have a purely psychological origin are frequently a product of the brain's interpreter rationalizing genetically driven body states. Make no mistake about it: this two-sided view of mind-brain interactions, if adopted, has implications for the management of one's personal life. (Gazzaniga, 1988, p. 229)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Mind-body Problem
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9 Philosophy
And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive ScienceIn the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)10) The Distinction between Dionysian Man and Apollonian Man, between Art and Creativity and Reason and Self- ControlIn his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy
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10 Bibliography
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
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11 block
1. noun1) (large piece) Klotz, derblock of wood — Holzklotz, der
2) (for chopping on) Hackklotz, der3) (for beheading on) Richtblock, der5) (coll.): (head)6) (of buildings) [Häuser]block, derblock of flats/offices — Wohnblock, der/Bürohaus, das
9) (pad of paper) Block, der10) (obstruction) Verstopfung, die11) (mental barrier)a mental block — eine geistige Sperre; Mattscheibe o. Art. (salopp)
12)2. transitive verbblock and tackle — Flaschenzug, der
1) (obstruct) blockieren, versperren [Tür, Straße, Durchgang, Sicht]; verstopfen [Nase]; blockieren [Fortschritt]; abblocken [Ball, Torschuss]2) (Commerc.) einfrieren [Investitionen, Guthaben]Phrasal Verbs:- academic.ru/84699/block_off">block off- block up* * *[blok] 1. noun1) (a flat-sided mass of wood or stone etc: blocks of stone.) der Block2) (a piece of wood used for certain purposes: a chopping-block.) der Hackklotz4) (a barrier: a road block.) das Hindernis5) ((especially American) a group of buildings bounded by four streets: a walk round the block.) der Häuserblock2. verb- blockade3. verbThe ships blockaded the town.) blockieren- blockage- blocked
- block capital/letter
- blockhead* * *[blɒk, AM blɑ:k]I. n\block of wood Holzklotz m2. (toy)building \block Bauklötzchen nt, Bauklotz m3. (for executions)▪ the \block der Richtblockto be first off the [starting] \blocks als Erster vom Start wegkommen\block of chocolate Block m [o [dicke] Tafel] Schokolade6. AUTOengine \block Motorblock m\block of shares Aktienpaket nt\block of tickets [Eintritts]karten pl in fortlaufender Reihesketch \block Zeichenblock mhigh-rise office [or tower] \block Bürohochhaus ntshower \block Duschraum mhis attitude is a \block to progress seine Einstellung hemmt den Fortschrittto have a mental \block eine geistige Sperre haben; (in exam) einen Black-out habenthe workers in this company have got a mental \block about change die Arbeiter dieser Firma sperren sich innerlich gegen jede Veränderung13. FINto put a \block on an account ein Konto sperren lassen18.▶ to be/sit/stand like a \block of stone wie versteinert sein/dasitzen/dastehen▶ to be a chip off the old \block ganz der Vater sein▶ to be like a \block of ice [gefühls]kalt sein▶ to be the new kid on the \block der/die Neue sein▶ to put one's head on the \block for sb für jdn durchs Feuer gehenII. adj attr, invto make \block bookings blockweise reservierenIII. vt1. (hinder passage)▪ to \block sth etw blockierento \block an artery/a pore/a pipeline eine Arterie/Pore/Pipeline verstopfento \block an exit/a passage einen Ausgang/Durchgang verstellen [o versperren]to \block the traffic den Verkehr blockieren [o aufhalten▪ to \block sth etw blockierento \block progress den Fortschritt aufhalten [o hemmen]to \block a project ein Vorhaben durchkreuzento \block a proposal einen Vorschlag blockierento \block sb's view/way jdm die Sicht/den Weg versperren▪ to \block sb jdm im Weg stehen3. FINto \block an account ein Konto sperrento \block payment die Zahlung verweigern4. SPORTto \block the ball den Ball abblockento \block one's opponent den Gegner blockieren* * *[blɒk]1. n1) Block m, Klotz m; (= executioner's block) Richtblock m; (= engine block) Motorblock mhuge ugly blocks of concrete —
to be sent to/to go to the block — dem Henker überantwortet werden/vor den Henker treten
2) (= building) Block mshe lived in the next block/three blocks from us (esp US) — sie wohnte im nächsten Block/drei Blocks or Straßen weiter
3) (= division of seats) Block m4) (= obstruction in pipe MED) Verstopfung f; (mental) geistige Sperre (about in Bezug auf +acc), Mattscheibe f (inf)I've a mental block about it — da habe ich totale Mattscheibe (inf)
6) (of tickets, shares) Block m7) (inf= head)
to knock sb's block off — jdm eins überziehen (inf)8) (usu pl) Startblock mto be first off the ( starting) blocks (fig) — als Erster aus den Startlöchern kommen
new kid on the block (inf) — Neuling m, Newcomer m (inf)
2. vt1) road, harbour, wheel, deal, move, sale blockieren; plans also im Wege stehen (+dat); traffic also, progress aufhalten; pipe verstopfen; (FTBL) one's opponent blocken; ball stoppento block sb's way/view — jdm den Weg/die Sicht versperren
2) credit sperren3. vi (SPORT)blocken* * *A sb) ARCH (hohler) Bausteinc) Baustein m, (Bau)Klötzchen n (für Kinder)2. Hackklotz m3. the block der Richtblock:go to the block das Schafott besteigen;send sb to the block jemanden aufs Schafott schicken4. (Schreib-, Notiz- etc) Block m6. Perückenstock m7. umg Birne f (Kopf): if you do that again I’ll knock your block off! mach ich Hackfleisch aus dir!8. Hutstock m9. Schuhmacherei:a) Lochholz nb) Leisten m10. TYPOa) Klischee n, Druckstock mb) Justierblock m (für Stereotypieplatten)c) Farbstein m (für Klischees)11. TECH Block m, Kloben m, Rolle f:block and tackle Flaschenzug m12. TECH (Auflage)Block m, Sockel m, Gestell n13. AUTO (Motor-, Zylinder-) Block m14. TECH Block m (dicke Platte aus Kunststoffhalbzeug)15. BAHN Blockstrecke fc) besonders US (Häuser)Block m:three blocks from here drei Straßen weiter17. Bauland nput on the block zur Versteigerung anbieten21. fig Block m, Gruppe f, z. B.22. MED Blockierung f, Block m:mental block fig (geistige) Sperre23. a) Hindernis nb) Absperrung f, Sperre fc) Verstopfung f, (Verkehrs) Stockung f, (-)Stauung f:there was a block in the pipe das Rohr war verstopft24. Philatelie: (Vierer- etc) Block m25. SPORT Abblocken n (eines Gegenspielers, Schlags etc)B v/t1. (auf einem Block) formen2. Buchbinderei: (mit Prägestempeln) pressen3. TECHa) sperrenb) aufbocken4. a) hemmen, hindern (auch fig)b) fig verhindern, durchkreuzen:5. a) (ab-, ver)sperren, blockierenb) verstopfen:a blocked artery MED eine verstopfte Arterie;my nose is blocked meine Nase ist verstopft oder zu;block one’s ears sich die Ohren zustopfen;blocked account Sperrkonto n;blocked credit eingefrorener Kredit8. SPORT einen Gegenspieler, Schlag etc abblockenC v/i1. SPORT seinen Gegenspieler, den Schlag etc abblocken3. TECH blockieren (Rad etc)bl. abk3. black4. block5. blueblk abk1. black2. block3. bulk* * *1. noun1) (large piece) Klotz, derblock of wood — Holzklotz, der
2) (for chopping on) Hackklotz, der3) (for beheading on) Richtblock, der4) (large mass of concrete or stone; building-stone) Block, der5) (coll.): (head)6) (of buildings) [Häuser]block, derblock of flats/offices — Wohnblock, der/Bürohaus, das
8) (large quantity) Masse, die9) (pad of paper) Block, der10) (obstruction) Verstopfung, die11) (mental barrier)a mental block — eine geistige Sperre; Mattscheibe o. Art. (salopp)
12)2. transitive verbblock and tackle — Flaschenzug, der
1) (obstruct) blockieren, versperren [Tür, Straße, Durchgang, Sicht]; verstopfen [Nase]; blockieren [Fortschritt]; abblocken [Ball, Torschuss]2) (Commerc.) einfrieren [Investitionen, Guthaben]Phrasal Verbs:- block up* * *(building) n.Trakt -e m. n.Block ¨-e m.Klotz ¨-er m. v.absperren v.blockieren v.verstopfen v. -
12 outlook
nounoutlook on life — Lebensauffassung, die
* * *1) (a view: Their house has a wonderful outlook.) die Aussicht2) (a person's view of life etc: He has a strange outlook (on life).) die Aussicht3) (what is likely to happen in the future: The weather outlook is bad.) die Aussicht* * *ˈout·lookneconomic \outlook Konjunkturaussichten plpositive \outlook on life positive Lebenseinstellung* * *['aUtlʊk]n2) (= prospects) (Zukunfts)aussichten pl; (MET) Aussichten pl3) (= mental attitude) Einstellung fhis outlook ( up)on life — seine Lebensauffassung, seine Einstellung zum Leben
what's his outlook on the matter? — wie steht er zu der Sache?
narrow outlook — beschränkter Horizont, (geistige) Beschränktheit
if you adopt such a narrow outlook — wenn Sie die Dinge so eng sehen
* * *outlook s1. (Aus)Blick m, (Aus)Sicht f2. ( auch Welt)Anschauung f, Auffassung f, Ansicht(en) f(pl), Einstellung f, Standpunkt m, POL auch Zielsetzung f:3. (Zukunfts)Aussicht(en) f(pl):further outlook METEO weitere Aussichten4. Ausguck m, Ausschau f, Warte f:on the outlook for fig auf der Suche nach, Ausschau haltend nach5. Wacht f, Wache f* * *noun2) (mental attitude) Haltung, die (on gegenüber)outlook on life — Lebensauffassung, die
* * *n.Ausblick -e m.Aussicht -en f. -
13 prospect
1. noun2) (expectation) Erwartung, die (of hinsichtlich)[at the] prospect of something/doing something — (mental picture, likelihood) [bei der] Aussicht auf etwas(Akk.) /[darauf], etwas zu tun
have the prospect of something, have something in prospect — etwas in Aussicht haben
a man with [good] prospects — ein Mann mit Zukunft
somebody's prospects of something/doing something — jemandes Chancen auf etwas (Akk.) /darauf, etwas zu tun
the prospects for somebody/something — die Aussichten für jemanden/etwas
4) (possible customer) [möglicher] Kunde/[mögliche] Kundin2. intransitive verbbe a good prospect for a race/the job — bei einem Rennen gute Chancen haben/ein aussichtsreicher Kandidat für den Job sein
(explore for mineral) prospektieren (Bergw.); nach Bodenschätzen suchen; (fig.) Ausschau halten ( for nach)* * *1. ['prospekt] noun1) (an outlook for the future; a view of what one may expect to happen: He didn't like the prospect of going abroad; a job with good prospects.) die Aussicht2) (a view or scene: a fine prospect.) die Aussicht2. [prə'spekt, ]( American[) 'prospekt] verb- academic.ru/58506/prospector">prospector- prospectus* * *pros·pectI. n[ˈprɒspekt, AM ˈprɑ:-]I have to meet my boss tomorrow and I don't relish the \prospect ich habe morgen ein Gespräch mit meinem Chef und könnte dankend darauf verzichten▪ the \prospect of doing sth die Aussicht, etw zu tunwhat are the \prospects of success in this venture? wie steht es um die Erfolgsaussichten bei diesem Unternehmen?3. (opportunities)▪ \prospects pl Aussichten pl, Chancen plher \prospects are good ihre Aussichten stehen gutemployment \prospects Aussichten auf Arbeit5. (potential customer) potenzieller Kunde/potenzielle Kundin; (potential employee) aussichtsreicher Kandidat/aussichtsreiche KandidatinII. vi[prəˈspekt, AM ˈprɑ:-]nach Bodenschätzen suchento \prospect for gold nach Gold suchen* * *['prɒspekt]1. n1) (= outlook, chance) Aussicht f (of auf +acc)he has no prospects — er hat keine Zukunft
to hold out the prospect of sth — etw in Aussicht stellen
2)I think this product would be a good prospect —
Manchester is a good prospect for the cup — Manchester ist ein aussichtsreicher Kandidat für den Pokal
a likely prospect as a customer/candidate — ein aussichtsreicher Kunde/Kandidat
a likely prospect as a husband —
2. vt[prə'spekt] (MIN) nach Bodenschätzen suchen in (+dat)3. vi[prə'spekt] (MIN) nach Bodenschätzen suchen* * *A sbe in prospect in Aussicht stehen, zu erwarten sein;hold out a prospect of etwas in Aussicht stellen;have sth in prospect etwas in Aussicht haben;no prospect of success keine Erfolgsaussichten;there is a prospect that … es besteht Aussicht, dass …;at the prospect of in Erwartung (gen);what a prospect! iron schöne Aussichten!4. a) WIRTSCH etc Interessent(in)c) mögliche(r) Kandidat(in)5. Bergbau:a) (Erz- etc) Anzeichen nb) Schürfprobe fc) Stelle f mit (Erz- etc) Anzeichend) Schürfstelle f, Lagerstätte fe) Schürfbetrieb m6. obs fig Überblick m (of über akk):on nearer prospect bei näherer BetrachtungB v/t [Br meist prəˈspekt]for nach Gold etc):prospect a district eine Gegend auf das Vorhandensein von Lagerstätten untersuchen2. MINER eine Fundstelle etc versuchsweise erschürfen, auf Erz-, Goldhaltigkeit etc untersuchenC v/i [Br meist prəˈspekt]prospect for oil nach Öl bohren;2. MINER sich gut, schlecht (zur Ausbeute) eignenfor nach)* * *1. noun2) (expectation) Erwartung, die (of hinsichtlich)[at the] prospect of something/doing something — (mental picture, likelihood) [bei der] Aussicht auf etwas(Akk.) /[darauf], etwas zu tun
have the prospect of something, have something in prospect — etwas in Aussicht haben
3) in pl. (hope of success) Zukunftsaussichtena man with [good] prospects — ein Mann mit Zukunft
somebody's prospects of something/doing something — jemandes Chancen auf etwas (Akk.) /darauf, etwas zu tun
the prospects for somebody/something — die Aussichten für jemanden/etwas
4) (possible customer) [möglicher] Kunde/[mögliche] Kundin2. intransitive verbbe a good prospect for a race/the job — bei einem Rennen gute Chancen haben/ein aussichtsreicher Kandidat für den Job sein
(explore for mineral) prospektieren (Bergw.); nach Bodenschätzen suchen; (fig.) Ausschau halten ( for nach)* * *n.Aussicht -en f.Chance n.Erwartung f.Perspektive f.Sicht -en f. -
14 vision
'viʒən1) (something seen in the imagination or in a dream: God appeared to him in a vision.) visión2) (the ability to see or plan into the future: Politicians should be men of vision.) visión (de futuro)3) (the ability to see or the sense of sight: He is slowly losing his vision.) vista, visiónvision n vista / visión
visión sustantivo femenino 1◊ ver visiones to be seeing things2 (enfoque, punto de vista) view; tener visión de futuro to be forward-looking
visión sustantivo femenino
1 (vista, sentido) sight, vision (alucinación) vision
2 (opinión) viewpoint, view
3 (capacidad de anticipación) sense
visión de futuro, forward-looking approach ' visión' also found in these entries: Spanish: aparición - binocular - campo - global - imponer - nublarse - panorama - vista - desvanecerse - espectáculo - fugaz - pesadilla - previsor - turbio - visual English: blur - cloud - overview - range - seeing - short-sighted - sight - vision - acumen - blurred - breadth - far - field - glimpse - grand - impair - line - sighted - survey - viewtr['vɪʒən]1 (gen) visión nombre femenino2 (eyesight) vista\SMALLIDIOMATIC EXPRESSION/SMALLa man of vision un hombre con visión de futurovision ['vɪʒən] n1) eyesight: vista f, visión f2) apparition: visión f, aparición f3) foresight: visión f (del futuro), previsión f4) image: imagen fshe had visions of a disaster: se imaginaba un desastren.• visión s.f.• vista s.f.'vɪʒən1)a) u ( faculty of sight) visión f, vista fgood/poor vision — buena/mala vista
b) ( visibility) visibilidad ffield of vision — campo m visual
2) u (imagination, foresight) visión f (de futuro)3) ca) ( dreamlike revelation) visión fb) (mental image, concept) imagen f, visión fI had visions of you being rushed to hospital — ya me imaginaba que te habrían llevado de urgencia al hospital
['vɪʒǝn]N1) (=eyesight) vista fdouble 6., tunnel 4.field of vision — campo m visual
2) (=farsightedness) clarividencia f, visión f de futuro; (=imagination) imaginación fwe need vision to make this idea work — nos hace falta clarividencia or visión de futuro para hacer que esta idea funcione
he had the vision to see that... — tenía la suficiente visión de futuro como para ver que...
3) (=dream, hope) visión fhe outlined his vision of the company over the next decade — esbozó su visión de la empresa para la siguiente década
4) (=image)5) (Rel) visión fChrist appeared to her in a vision — tuvo una visión de Cristo, se le apareció Cristo
* * *['vɪʒən]1)a) u ( faculty of sight) visión f, vista fgood/poor vision — buena/mala vista
b) ( visibility) visibilidad ffield of vision — campo m visual
2) u (imagination, foresight) visión f (de futuro)3) ca) ( dreamlike revelation) visión fb) (mental image, concept) imagen f, visión f -
15 Psychology
We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of ourselves; which deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of man, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of nature.... [W]e proceed to human philosophy or Humanity, which hath two parts: the one considereth man segregate, or distributively; the other congregate, or in society. So as Human philosophy is either Simple and Particular, or Conjugate and Civil. Humanity Particular consisteth of the same parts whereof man consisteth; that is, of knowledges which respect the Body, and of knowledges that respect the Mind... how the one discloseth the other and how the one worketh upon the other... [:] the one is honored with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other of Hippocrates. (Bacon, 1878, pp. 236-237)The claims of Psychology to rank as a distinct science are... not smaller but greater than those of any other science. If its phenomena are contemplated objectively, merely as nervo-muscular adjustments by which the higher organisms from moment to moment adapt their actions to environing co-existences and sequences, its degree of specialty, even then, entitles it to a separate place. The moment the element of feeling, or consciousness, is used to interpret nervo-muscular adjustments as thus exhibited in the living beings around, objective Psychology acquires an additional, and quite exceptional, distinction. (Spencer, 1896, p. 141)Kant once declared that psychology was incapable of ever raising itself to the rank of an exact natural science. The reasons that he gives... have often been repeated in later times. In the first place, Kant says, psychology cannot become an exact science because mathematics is inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense; the pure internal perception, in which mental phenomena must be constructed,-time,-has but one dimension. In the second place, however, it cannot even become an experimental science, because in it the manifold of internal observation cannot be arbitrarily varied,-still less, another thinking subject be submitted to one's experiments, comformably to the end in view; moreover, the very fact of observation means alteration of the observed object. (Wundt, 1904, p. 6)It is [Gustav] Fechner's service to have found and followed the true way; to have shown us how a "mathematical psychology" may, within certain limits, be realized in practice.... He was the first to show how Herbart's idea of an "exact psychology" might be turned to practical account. (Wundt, 1904, pp. 6-7)"Mind," "intellect," "reason," "understanding," etc. are concepts... that existed before the advent of any scientific psychology. The fact that the naive consciousness always and everywhere points to internal experience as a special source of knowledge, may, therefore, be accepted for the moment as sufficient testimony to the rights of psychology as science.... "Mind," will accordingly be the subject, to which we attribute all the separate facts of internal observation as predicates. The subject itself is determined p. 17) wholly and exclusively by its predicates. (Wundt, 1904,The study of animal psychology may be approached from two different points of view. We may set out from the notion of a kind of comparative physiology of mind, a universal history of the development of mental life in the organic world. Or we may make human psychology the principal object of investigation. Then, the expressions of mental life in animals will be taken into account only so far as they throw light upon the evolution of consciousness in man.... Human psychology... may confine itself altogether to man, and generally has done so to far too great an extent. There are plenty of psychological text-books from which you would hardly gather that there was any other conscious life than the human. (Wundt, 1907, pp. 340-341)The Behaviorist began his own formulation of the problem of psychology by sweeping aside all medieval conceptions. He dropped from his scientific vocabulary all subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire, purpose, and even thinking and emotion as they were subjectively defined. (Watson, 1930, pp. 5-6)According to the medieval classification of the sciences, psychology is merely a chapter of special physics, although the most important chapter; for man is a microcosm; he is the central figure of the universe. (deWulf, 1956, p. 125)At the beginning of this century the prevailing thesis in psychology was Associationism.... Behavior proceeded by the stream of associations: each association produced its successors, and acquired new attachments with the sensations arriving from the environment.In the first decade of the century a reaction developed to this doctrine through the work of the Wurzburg school. Rejecting the notion of a completely self-determining stream of associations, it introduced the task ( Aufgabe) as a necessary factor in describing the process of thinking. The task gave direction to thought. A noteworthy innovation of the Wurzburg school was the use of systematic introspection to shed light on the thinking process and the contents of consciousness. The result was a blend of mechanics and phenomenalism, which gave rise in turn to two divergent antitheses, Behaviorism and the Gestalt movement. The behavioristic reaction insisted that introspection was a highly unstable, subjective procedure.... Behaviorism reformulated the task of psychology as one of explaining the response of organisms as a function of the stimuli impinging upon them and measuring both objectively. However, Behaviorism accepted, and indeed reinforced, the mechanistic assumption that the connections between stimulus and response were formed and maintained as simple, determinate functions of the environment.The Gestalt reaction took an opposite turn. It rejected the mechanistic nature of the associationist doctrine but maintained the value of phenomenal observation. In many ways it continued the Wurzburg school's insistence that thinking was more than association-thinking has direction given to it by the task or by the set of the subject. Gestalt psychology elaborated this doctrine in genuinely new ways in terms of holistic principles of organization.Today psychology lives in a state of relatively stable tension between the poles of Behaviorism and Gestalt psychology.... (Newell & Simon, 1963, pp. 279-280)As I examine the fate of our oppositions, looking at those already in existence as guide to how they fare and shape the course of science, it seems to me that clarity is never achieved. Matters simply become muddier and muddier as we go down through time. Thus, far from providing the rungs of a ladder by which psychology gradually climbs to clarity, this form of conceptual structure leads rather to an ever increasing pile of issues, which we weary of or become diverted from, but never really settle. (Newell, 1973b, pp. 288-289)The subject matter of psychology is as old as reflection. Its broad practical aims are as dated as human societies. Human beings, in any period, have not been indifferent to the validity of their knowledge, unconcerned with the causes of their behavior or that of their prey and predators. Our distant ancestors, no less than we, wrestled with the problems of social organization, child rearing, competition, authority, individual differences, personal safety. Solving these problems required insights-no matter how untutored-into the psychological dimensions of life. Thus, if we are to follow the convention of treating psychology as a young discipline, we must have in mind something other than its subject matter. We must mean that it is young in the sense that physics was young at the time of Archimedes or in the sense that geometry was "founded" by Euclid and "fathered" by Thales. Sailing vessels were launched long before Archimedes discovered the laws of bouyancy [ sic], and pillars of identical circumference were constructed before anyone knew that C IID. We do not consider the ship builders and stone cutters of antiquity physicists and geometers. Nor were the ancient cave dwellers psychologists merely because they rewarded the good conduct of their children. The archives of folk wisdom contain a remarkable collection of achievements, but craft-no matter how perfected-is not science, nor is a litany of successful accidents a discipline. If psychology is young, it is young as a scientific discipline but it is far from clear that psychology has attained this status. (Robinson, 1986, p. 12)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Psychology
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16 block
block [blɒk]1 noun(a) (of ice, stone, wood) bloc m; (of chocolate) grosse tablette f; (for butcher, executioner) billot m; (for athletes) bloc m de départ;∎ American the painting was on the (auctioneer's) block le tableau était mis aux enchères;∎ to put or to lay one's head on the block prendre des risques∎ (building) blocks jeu m de construction, (jeu m de) cubes mpl(c) (of seats) groupe m; Stock Exchange (of shares) paquet m; (of tickets) série f; Computing bloc m(d) (area of land) pâté m de maisons;∎ we walked round the block nous avons fait le tour du pâté de maisons;∎ American the school is five blocks away l'école est à cinq rues d'ici;∎ the new kid on the block le petit nouveau∎ block of flats immeuble (d'habitation)(f) (obstruction → in pipe, tube) obstruction f; American (→ in traffic) embouteillage m; Medicine & Psychology blocage m;∎ to have a (mental) block about sth faire un blocage sur qch;∎ I have a (mental) block about mathematics je fais un blocage sur les mathématiques∎ he's suffering from writer's block il n'arrive pas à écrire, c'est le vide ou le blocage total∎ I'll knock your block off! je vais te démolir le portrait!(i) (of paper) bloc m∎ block (and tackle) palan m, moufles mpl(k) (in engraving → wood) planche f, bois m(booking, vote) groupé(a) (obstruct → pipe, tube) boucher; (→ road) bloquer, barrer; (→ view) boucher, cacher; (→ artery) obstruer;∎ don't block the door! dégagez la porte!;∎ to block one's ears se boucher les oreilles;∎ to block sb's way barrer le chemin à qn;∎ that building blocks the sun ce bâtiment empêche le soleil d'entrer(b) (hinder → traffic) bloquer, gêner; (→ progress) gêner, enrayer; Finance (→ credit, deal, funds, account) bloquer; Medicine (→ pain) anesthésier; Sport (→ ball) bloquer; (→ opponent) faire obstruction à;∎ Parliament to block a bill faire obstruction à un projet de loi;∎ the goalkeeper blocked the shot le gardien arrêta le tir;∎ Tennis she blocked the serve magnificently elle fit un superbe retour de service(c) (hat, knitting) mettre en formeSport faire de l'obstruction►► Typography block capital (caractère m) majuscule f;∎ in block capitals en majuscules;Computing block copy copie f de bloc;block diagram Computing & Geography bloc-diagramme m; Electronics schéma m (de principe);British Administration block grant dotation f (aux collectivités locales);Stock Exchange block issue émission f par série;Typography block letter (caractère m) majuscule f;∎ in block letters en majuscules;American block party fête f de rue;British Industry block release = système de stages de formation qui alternent avec une activité professionnelle;Stock Exchange block trading négociations fpl de bloc;Politics & Industry block vote = mode de scrutin utilisé par les syndicats britanniques par opposition au mode de scrutin "un homme, une voix"∎ I've been blocked in ma voiture est bloquée(road) bloquer, barrer; (door, part of road, window) condamner; (view) boucher, cacher; (sun) cacher∎ to block out the memory of sb/sth refouler le souvenir de qn/qch∎ my nose is blocked up j'ai le nez bouchéⓘ BLOCK VOTE Le "block vote" donne au vote d'un délégué syndical la valeur non pas de sa seule voix, mais de toutes les voix de la section qu'il représente. -
17 Intelligence
There is no mystery about it: the child who is familiar with books, ideas, conversation-the ways and means of the intellectual life-before he begins school, indeed, before he begins consciously to think, has a marked advantage. He is at home in the House of intellect just as the stableboy is at home among horses, or the child of actors on the stage. (Barzun, 1959, p. 142)It is... no exaggeration to say that sensory-motor intelligence is limited to desiring success or practical adaptation, whereas the function of verbal or conceptual thought is to know and state truth. (Piaget, 1954, p. 359)ntelligence has two parts, which we shall call the epistemological and the heuristic. The epistemological part is the representation of the world in such a form that the solution of problems follows from the facts expressed in the representation. The heuristic part is the mechanism that on the basis of the information solves the problem and decides what to do. (McCarthy & Hayes, 1969, p. 466)Many scientists implicitly assume that, among all animals, the behavior and intelligence of nonhuman primates are most like our own. Nonhuman primates have relatively larger brains and proportionally more neocortex than other species... and it now seems likely that humans, chimpanzees, and gorillas shared a common ancestor as recently as 5 to 7 million years ago.... This assumption about the unique status of primate intelligence is, however, just that: an assumption. The relations between intelligence and measures of brain size is poorly understood, and evolutionary affinity does not always ensure behavioral similarity. Moreover, the view that nonhuman primates are the animals most like ourselves coexists uneasily in our minds with the equally pervasive view that primates differ fundamentally from us because they lack language; lacking language, they also lack many of the capacities necessary for reasoning and abstract thought. (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990, p. 4)Few constructs are asked to serve as many functions in psychology as is the construct of human intelligence.... Consider four of the main functions addressed in theory and research on intelligence, and how they differ from one another.1. Biological. This type of account looks at biological processes. To qualify as a useful biological construct, intelligence should be a biochemical or biophysical process or at least somehow a resultant of biochemical or biophysical processes.2. Cognitive approaches. This type of account looks at molar cognitive representations and processes. To qualify as a useful mental construct, intelligence should be specifiable as a set of mental representations and processes that are identifiable through experimental, mathematical, or computational means.3. Contextual approaches. To qualify as a useful contextual construct, intelligence should be a source of individual differences in accomplishments in "real-world" performances. It is not enough just to account for performance in the laboratory. On [sic] the contextual view, what a person does in the lab may not even remotely resemble what the person would do outside it. Moreover, different cultures may have different conceptions of intelligence, which affect what would count as intelligent in one cultural context versus another.4. Systems approaches. Systems approaches attempt to understand intelligence through the interaction of cognition with context. They attempt to establish a link between the two levels of analysis, and to analyze what forms this link takes. (Sternberg, 1994, pp. 263-264)High but not the highest intelligence, combined with the greatest degrees of persistence, will achieve greater eminence than the highest degree of intelligence with somewhat less persistence. (Cox, 1926, p. 187)There are no definitive criteria of intelligence, just as there are none for chairness; it is a fuzzy-edged concept to which many features are relevant. Two people may both be quite intelligent and yet have very few traits in common-they resemble the prototype along different dimensions.... [Intelligence] is a resemblance between two individuals, one real and the other prototypical. (Neisser, 1979, p. 185)Given the complementary strengths and weaknesses of the differential and information-processing approaches, it should be possible, at least in theory, to synthesise an approach that would capitalise upon the strength of each approach, and thereby share the weakness of neither. (Sternberg, 1977, p. 65)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Intelligence
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18 Introspection
1) Experimental Introspection Is the One Reliable Method of Knowing OurselvesWhen we are trying to understand the mental processes of a child or a dog or an insect as shown by conduct and action, the outward signs of mental processes,... we must always fall back upon experimental introspection... [;] we cannot imagine processes in another mind that we do not find in our own. Experimental introspection is thus our one reliable method of knowing ourselves; it is the sole gateway to psychology. (Titchener, 1914, p. 32)There is a somewhat misleading point of view that one's own experience provides a sufficient understanding of mental life for scientific purposes. Indeed, early in the history of experimental psychology, the main method for studying cognition was introspection. By observing one's own mind, the argument went, one could say how one carried out cognitive activities....Yet introspection failed to be a good technique for the elucidation of mental processes in general. There are two simple reasons for this. First, so many things which we can do seem to be quite unrelated to conscious experience. Someone asks you your name. You do not know how you retrieve it, yet obviously there is some process by which the retrieval occurs. In the same way, when someone speaks to you, you understand what they say, but you do not know how you came to understand. Yet somehow processes take place in which words are picked out from the jumble of sound waves which reach your ears, in-built knowledge of syntax and semantics gives it meaning, and the significance of the message comes to be appreciated. Clearly, introspection is not of much use here, but it is undeniable that understanding language is as much a part of mental life as is thinking.As if these arguments were not enough, it is also the case that introspective data are notoriously difficult to evaluate. Because it is private to the experiencer, and experience may be difficult to convey in words to somebody else. Many early introspective protocols were very confusing to read and, even worse, the kinds of introspection reported tended to conform to the theoretical categories used in different laboratories. Clearly, what was needed was both a change in experimental method and a different (non-subjective) theoretical framework to describe mental life. (Sanford, 1987, pp. 2-3)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Introspection
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19 Mind
It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science... to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder in which they lie involved when made the object of reflection and inquiry.... It cannot be doubted that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from one another, and that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reflection and, consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding. (Hume, 1955, p. 22)Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from Experience. (Locke, quoted in Herrnstein & Boring, 1965, p. 584)The kind of logic in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science, and... the difference lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process, but in the nature of things to which it is applied.... Man has always been thinking equally well; the improvement lies, not in an alleged progress of man's mind, but in the discovery of new areas to which it may apply its unchanged and unchanging powers. (Leґvi-Strauss, 1963, p. 230)MIND. A mysterious form of matter secreted by the brain. Its chief activity consists in the endeavor to ascertain its own nature, the futility of the attempt being due to the fact that it has nothing but itself to know itself with. (Bierce, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 55)[Philosophy] understands the foundations of knowledge and it finds these foundations in a study of man-as-knower, of the "mental processes" or the "activity of representation" which make knowledge possible. To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind, so to understand the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representation.... We owe the notion of a "theory of knowledge" based on an understanding of "mental processes" to the seventeenth century, and especially to Locke. We owe the notion of "the mind" as a separate entity in which "processes" occur to the same period, and especially to Descartes. We owe the notion of philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rest of culture, to the eighteenth century and especially to Kant, but this Kantian notion presupposed general assent to Lockean notions of mental processes and Cartesian notions of mental substance. (Rorty, 1979, pp. 3-4)Under pressure from the computer, the question of mind in relation to machine is becoming a central cultural preoccupation. It is becoming for us what sex was to Victorians-threat, obsession, taboo, and fascination. (Turkle, 1984, p. 313)7) Understanding the Mind Remains as Resistant to Neurological as to Cognitive AnalysesRecent years have been exciting for researchers in the brain and cognitive sciences. Both fields have flourished, each spurred on by methodological and conceptual developments, and although understanding the mechanisms of mind is an objective shared by many workers in these areas, their theories and approaches to the problem are vastly different....Early experimental psychologists, such as Wundt and James, were as interested in and knowledgeable about the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system as about the young science of the mind. However, the experimental study of mental processes was short-lived, being eclipsed by the rise of behaviorism early in this century. It was not until the late 1950s that the signs of a new mentalism first appeared in scattered writings of linguists, philosophers, computer enthusiasts, and psychologists.In this new incarnation, the science of mind had a specific mission: to challenge and replace behaviorism. In the meantime, brain science had in many ways become allied with a behaviorist approach.... While behaviorism sought to reduce the mind to statements about bodily action, brain science seeks to explain the mind in terms of physiochemical events occurring in the nervous system. These approaches contrast with contemporary cognitive science, which tries to understand the mind as it is, without any reduction, a view sometimes described as functionalism.The cognitive revolution is now in place. Cognition is the subject of contemporary psychology. This was achieved with little or no talk of neurons, action potentials, and neurotransmitters. Similarly, neuroscience has risen to an esteemed position among the biological sciences without much talk of cognitive processes. Do the fields need each other?... [Y]es because the problem of understanding the mind, unlike the wouldbe problem solvers, respects no disciplinary boundaries. It remains as resistant to neurological as to cognitive analyses. (LeDoux & Hirst, 1986, pp. 1-2)Since the Second World War scientists from different disciplines have turned to the study of the human mind. Computer scientists have tried to emulate its capacity for visual perception. Linguists have struggled with the puzzle of how children acquire language. Ethologists have sought the innate roots of social behaviour. Neurophysiologists have begun to relate the function of nerve cells to complex perceptual and motor processes. Neurologists and neuropsychologists have used the pattern of competence and incompetence of their brain-damaged patients to elucidate the normal workings of the brain. Anthropologists have examined the conceptual structure of cultural practices to advance hypotheses about the basic principles of the mind. These days one meets engineers who work on speech perception, biologists who investigate the mental representation of spatial relations, and physicists who want to understand consciousness. And, of course, psychologists continue to study perception, memory, thought and action.... [W]orkers in many disciplines have converged on a number of central problems and explanatory ideas. They have realized that no single approach is likely to unravel the workings of the mind: it will not give up its secrets to psychology alone; nor is any other isolated discipline-artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, neurophysiology, philosophy-going to have any greater success. (Johnson-Laird, 1988, p. 7)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Mind
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20 position
1. noun1) (place occupied) Platz, der; (of player in team; of plane, ship, etc.) Position, die; (of hands of clock, words, stars) Stellung, die; (of building) Lage, die; (of river) [Ver]lauf, dertake [up] one's position — seinen Platz einnehmen
after the second lap he was in fourth position — nach der zweiten Runde lag er an vierter Stelle
he finished in second position — er belegte den zweiten Platz
2) (proper place)be in/out of position — an seinem Platz/nicht an seinem Platz sein
3) (Mil.) Stellung, dietake up a position on something — einen Standpunkt od. eine Haltung zu etwas einnehmen
5) (fig.): (situation)be in a good position [financially] — [finanziell] gut gestellt sein od. dastehen
put yourself in my position! — versetz dich [einmal] in meine Lage!
be in a position to do something — in der Lage sein, etwas zu tun
the position of assistant manager — die Stelle od. Position des stellvertretenden Geschäftsführers
2. transitive verbposition of trust — Vertrauensstellung, die; Vertrauensposten, der
1) platzieren; aufstellen, postieren [Polizisten, Wachen]position oneself near the exit — sich in die Nähe des Ausgangs stellen/setzen; [Wache, Posten usw.:] sich in der Nähe des Ausgangs aufstellen
2) (Mil.): (station) stationieren* * *[ə'ziʃən] 1. noun1) (a way of standing, sitting etc: He lay in an uncomfortable position.) die Stellung2) (a place or situation: The house is in a beautiful position.) die Lage3) (a job; a post: He has a good position with a local bank.) die Stellung4) (a point of view: Let me explain my position on employment.) die Haltung2. verb(to put or place: He positioned the lamp in the middle of the table.) stellen- academic.ru/115295/be_in">be in- out of position* * *po·si·tion[pəˈzɪʃən]I. nthe house has a good \position overlooking the valley man hat vom Haus aus einen guten Blick über das Talthe sofa is in a different \position now jetzt steht das Sofa woandersto take up a \position sich akk platzierento be in \position an seinem/ihrem Platz seinthe dancers moved into \position die Tänzer nahmen ihre Position[en] einto move sth into \position etw zurechtrückento move out of \position seinen/ihren Platz verlassenyoga \position Yogahaltung flying/sitting \position liegende/sitzende Stellung, liegend/sitzendto change one's \position eine andere Stellung einnehmenhis \position is in midfield er ist Mittelstürmerthe \position of women in society die gesellschaftliche Stellung der Fraushe finished the race in third \position sie belegte bei dem Rennen am Schluss den dritten Platza \position of responsibility ein verantwortungsvoller Postena \position of trust eine Vertrauensstellunga teaching \position eine Stelle als Lehrer/Lehrerinto apply for a \position sich akk um eine [Arbeits]stelle bewerbenput yourself in my \position versetz dich in meine Lage▪ to be in a/no \position to do sth in der Lage/nicht in der Lage sein, etw zu tunto put sb in an awkward \position jdn in eine unangenehme Lage bringenfinancial \position Vermögensverhältnisse plwhat's the company's \position on recycling? welchen Standpunkt vertritt die Firma in der Frage des Recycling?his \position is that... er steht auf dem Standpunkt, dass...a party's \position on defence die Position einer Partei zur Frage der Verteidigungto take the \position that... die Meinung vertreten, dass...to take a \position in a share Aktien für eigene Rechnung kaufenbear \position Baisseposition fbull \position Hausse-Engagement nt, Hausseposition fto close a \position eine Position schließen [o glattstellen]to cover a \position eine Position abdeckenlong \position Hausse-Engagement nt, Long-Position fshort \position Baisse-Engagement nt, Short-Position fII. vt▪ to \position sb/sth jdn/etw platzierenI \positioned myself as far away from him as possible ich habe mich so weit wie möglich von ihm weggesetztto \position guns/troops MIL Gewehre in Stellung bringen/Truppen positionieren* * *[pə'zISən]1. n1) (= location, place where sb/sth is of person) Platz m; (of object) Stelle f, Platz m; (of microphone, statue, wardrobe, plant etc) Standort m; (of spotlight, table, in picture, painting) Anordnung f; (of town, house etc) Lage f; (of plane, ship, SPORT = starting position, FTBL ETC) Position f; (MIL = strategic site) Stellung fto be in/out of position —
the actors were in position on the stage — die Schauspieler hatten ihre Plätze auf der Bühne eingenommen
to jockey or jostle for position (lit) — um eine gute Ausgangsposition kämpfen; (fig)
his position is full-back/goalkeeper — er spielt Außenverteidiger/Torwart
2) (= posture, way of standing, sitting etc) Haltung f; (in love-making, ART of model) Stellung f; (BALLET) Position f3) (in class, league etc) Platz mafter the third lap he was in fourth position — nach der dritten Runde lag er auf dem vierten Platz or war er Vierter
to finish in third position — Dritter werden, auf dem dritten Platz landen (inf)
5) (= job) Stelle fhe has a high position in the Ministry of Defence — er bekleidet eine hohe Stellung or Position im Verteidigungsministerium
6) (fig: situation, circumstance) Lage fto be in a position to do sth — in der Lage sein, etw zu tun
what is the position regarding...? — wie sieht es mit... aus?
my position is that I don't have the qualifications/money — mir geht es so, dass mir die Qualifikation/das Geld fehlt
what is the government's position on...? — welchen Standpunkt vertritt die Regierung zu...?
2. vt1) (= place in position) microphone, ladder, guards aufstellen; soldiers, policemen postieren; (artist, photographer etc) platzieren; (COMPUT) cursor positionieren, platzierenhe positioned himself where he could see her — er stellte or (seated) setzte sich so, dass er sie sehen konnte
* * *position [pəˈzıʃn]A sposition of the sun Sonnenstand m;a good position to shoot SPORT eine gute Schussposition;draw the goalkeeper out of position SPORT den Torhüter herauslockena) FLUG, SCHIFF Positionslichter,b) AUTO Begrenzungslichterupright position aufrechte (Körper)Haltung4. MEDb) (Kinds)Lage f (im Mutterleib)5. TECH (Schalt- etc)Stellung f:position of rest Ruhelage f, -stellung6. MIL (Verteidigungs)Stellung f:position warfare Stellungskrieg m7. MUS Lage f (von Akkordtönen):close (open) position enge (weite) Lage8. MUSa) Lage f (bestimmtes Gebiet des Griffbretts bei Saiteninstrumenten)b) Zugstellung f (bei der Posaune)9. IT (Wert)Stelle f10. Position f, Situation f, Lage f:be in a position to do sth in der Lage sein, etwas zu tun;11. (Sach)Lage f, Stand m (der Dinge):financial position Finanzlage, Vermögensverhältnisse pl;legal position Rechtslage12. soziale Stellung, gesellschaftlicher Rang:people of position Leute von Rang13. Position f, Stellung f, Amt n, Posten m:hold a (responsible) position eine (verantwortliche) Stelle innehaben;position of power Machtposition;position of trust Vertrauensstellung, -posten14. fig (Ein)Stellung f, Standpunkt m, Haltung f:define one’s position seinen Standpunkt darlegen;take up a position on a question zu einer Frage Stellung nehmen15. MATH, PHIL (Grund-, Lehr)Satz m, Behauptung fB v/t1. in die richtige Lage oder Stellung bringen, an den rechten Platz stellen, aufstellen, TECH auch (ein)stellen, anbringen2. Polizisten etc postierenpos. abk1. position Pos.2. positive pos.* * *1. noun1) (place occupied) Platz, der; (of player in team; of plane, ship, etc.) Position, die; (of hands of clock, words, stars) Stellung, die; (of building) Lage, die; (of river) [Ver]lauf, dertake [up] one's position — seinen Platz einnehmen
be in/out of position — an seinem Platz/nicht an seinem Platz sein
3) (Mil.) Stellung, dietake up a position on something — einen Standpunkt od. eine Haltung zu etwas einnehmen
5) (fig.): (situation)be in a good position [financially] — [finanziell] gut gestellt sein od. dastehen
put yourself in my position! — versetz dich [einmal] in meine Lage!
be in a position to do something — in der Lage sein, etwas zu tun
the position of assistant manager — die Stelle od. Position des stellvertretenden Geschäftsführers
2. transitive verbposition of trust — Vertrauensstellung, die; Vertrauensposten, der
1) platzieren; aufstellen, postieren [Polizisten, Wachen]position oneself near the exit — sich in die Nähe des Ausgangs stellen/setzen; [Wache, Posten usw.:] sich in der Nähe des Ausgangs aufstellen
2) (Mil.): (station) stationieren* * *n.Gewandtheit f.Lage -n f.Position -en f.Standort -e m.Standpunkt m.Stellung -en f. v.positionieren v.
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